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Abstract
Every day, people make decisions about whether to
trust machines with their personal information, such as
letting a phone track one’s location. How do people
decide whether to trust a machine? In a field
experiment, we tested how two modes of interaction—
expression modality, whether the person is talking or
typing to a machine, and response modality, whether the
machine is talking or typing back—influence the
willingness to trust a machine. Based on research that
expressing oneself verbally reduces self-control
compared to nonverbal expression, we predicted that
talking to a machine might make people more willing to
share their personal information. Based on research on
the link between anthropomorphism and trust, we
further predicted that machines who talked (versus
texted) would seem more human-like and be trusted
more. Using a popular chatterbot phone application, we
randomly assigned over 300 community members to
either talk or type to the phone, which either talked or
typed in return. We then measured how much
participants anthropomorphized the machine and their
willingness to share their personal information (e.g.,
their location, credit card information) with it. Results
revealed that talking made people more willing to share
their personal information than texting, and this was
robust to participants’ self-reported comfort with
technology,
age,
gender,
and
conversation
characteristics. But listening to the application’s voice
did not affect anthropomorphism or trust compared to
reading its text. We conclude by considering the
theoretical and practical implications of this experiment
for understanding how people trust machines.

1. Introduction
Every day, people make decisions about whether to
trust machines with their personal information. From
entering one’s credit card number into a company’s
website to allowing a phone to track one’s location,
these decisions require trusting machines with personal,
and potentially sensitive, information. How do people
decide whether to trust a machine? We explore how the
modality by which people interact with machines can
affect how much they are willing to trust them with
personal information. Specifically we consider two
criteria—whether the user is typing or talking to the
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machine (i.e., expression modality) and whether the
machine is typing or talking back (i.e., response
modality).
We draw from two primary findings across the
diverse fields of cognition, neuroscience, and social
psychology to form predictions about the effect of
expression and response modality on machine trust.
First, expression modality should primarily affect the
user’s cognitive state. Indeed, research on expression
modality suggests that verbal (versus nonverbal or
physical) modes of expression can reduce self-control
behavior [1-3]. For instance, verbally expressing one’s
choice (i.e., speaking) increases heuristic decisionmaking and indulgence, thereby reducing self-control,
compared to physically expressing one’s choice (e.g.,
button pressing, pointing, typing) for identical selfcontrol dilemmas [1]. As such, we expect that having a
spoken conversation with a machine, as opposed to a
typed conversation, may make users more likely to give
up personal information, failing to exert control over
their information.
Second, response modality should primarily affect
the user’s perception of the machine. A machine that can
create speech should be judged as more human-like than
a machine that creates text. One set of experiments
illustrated this directly: when participants read a piece
of text that had been created by either a human or
machine, they were less likely to believe the text had
been written by a human than those who heard the same
text spoken aloud [4].Furthermore, anthropomorphizing
a machine by assuming it is more humanlike (e.g.,
seems more rational, competent, thoughtful, and even
emotional) may increase trust. For example, self-driving
cars with human voices seem more human-like and are
trusted more by users [5]. These data lead us to predict
that users will trust talking machines more than texting
machines.
However, there are at least two important caveats
that may exist in the relationship between response
modality and trust. First, anthropomorphism is unlikely
to always lead to trust. For instance, users feel
threatened by machines that seem too intelligent [6].
Therefore, the level of machine competence, and
whether or not the machine seems threatening, may
matter. Second, the quality of the voice is also likely to
matter when evoking anthropomorphism. Prior research
suggests that only humanlike speech with voices that
naturalistically vary in pitch, amplitude, and rate of
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speech, can increase perceptions of humanization [4, 7].
In contrast, more monotone and robotic voices may be
judged no differently from text.
In a field experiment, we test the effect of
expression modality and response modality on trust in
machines. We predict two main effects: that talking to a
machine, and being talked to, will increase trust. It is
also possible that these two variables could interact. For
example, the effect of response modality might be larger
when the user is talking to the machine than typing to
the machine, because it feels more like a real
conversation with both agents talk to one another. We
therefore tested for interactions in addition to main
effects.

1.1. Trust in Machines
Trust is an essential ingredient in social interaction
that influences decisions about how people will behave
toward others in personal and organizational contexts.
For example, having trust improves the stability of
economic and political exchange [8], reduces
transaction costs [9], facilitates cooperation [10], and
helps firms and individuals manage risk [11].
Conversely, trust violations can harm cooperation and
bargaining outcomes [12, 13], lower organizational
commitment [14], provoke retaliation [15], and even
trigger organizational-level failures [16]. Golembiewski
and McConkie [16, p. 131] argued that, ‘‘There is no
single variable which so thoroughly influences
interpersonal and group behavior as does trust.’’
Extending from this literature, trust is not just a
critical predictor of how humans behave toward other
humans, but also of how humans behave toward
machines. It has particular security implications,
whereby humans may become vulnerable to machine
attacks if they mistakenly put their trust in machines.
Consistent with prior research, we define trust as ‘‘a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behavior of another’’ [18, p. 395]. By this
definition, the decision to trust another agent is
contingent on two aspects: the person’s own
psychological state and the person’s expectations about
the agent’s intentions. The former may be influenced by
expression modality, because expressing oneself
differently can change a person’s mindset, and the latter
influenced by response modality, because the machine’s
responsiveness can affect anthropomorphism.

1.2. Expression Modality and Trust
Although the normative principle of procedure
invariance predicts that expression modality should not
affect decision-making, a great deal of psychological

research suggests just the opposite. A prominent
example is the Stroop task [19], a classic self-control
task whereby participants are presented with color
words (e.g., blue, green) printed in the opposite colored
ink (e.g., the word “blue” printed in green ink). The
participant’s task is to verbalize the ink color, overriding
the automatic tendency to verbalize the word itself.
Interestingly, when participants enter their response
manually, via a keystroke, the Stroop effect is smaller
than when they speak the colors aloud [2]. This effect
persists even with practice [20]. Consistent with these
findings, there tends to be greater activation an area of
the brain associated with identifying self-control
conflicts, the cognitive/dorsal area of the anterior
cingulate cortex, during manual response to the Stroop
task than during oral response [3, 21].
One recent set of eighteen experiments tested the
effect of expression modality on decision-making
among consumers making choices relevant to selfcontrol (e.g., between an apple or candy) [1]. These
experiments manipulated whether the participant spoke
to indicate their choice, compared to non-verbal
preferences modalities such as clicking, buttonpressing, pointing, taking, or writing. Across the set of
studies, speaking tended to result in the more indulgent
choice. One possible reason for these findings is that
speaking triggers a heuristic mindset, whereby people
rely more on their intuitive preferences.
If spoken interaction elicits greater behavioral
disinhibition than text-based interaction, as the
aforementioned literature suggests, this may have
implications for a user’s willingness to trust a machine.
Indeed, prior research among humans demonstrates that
reduced inhibition increases social disclosure [e.g., due
to alcohol consumption, 22, or visual anonymity, 23]. In
other words, people who feel more disinhibited might
also be more likely to disclose to their interaction
partner. Moreover, this effect could even be cyclical:
greater disclosure can lead to greater liking, which
further increases disclosure [24]. In sum, the prior
research on expression modality, self-control, and
disclosure lead us to predict that talking a machine
might lead a user to be more likely to share personal
information with it, compared to typing to the machine.

1.3. Response Modality and Trust
Prior research in person perception examines how
observing a person via different communication
media—for example, being able to hear a person (e.g.,
via an audio clip) or read a person’s thoughts (e.g., a
transcribed speech or written statement)—influence
how observers make judgments about the person’s
mental capacities and mental states. In one line of
research, observers seem to have greater empathic
accuracy—can
more
accurately
discern
a
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communicator’s self-reported thoughts and feelings—
when they hear a communicator speak than when they
read the same content [22-25]. For instance, observers
can more accurately predict sarcasm and humor when
they can hear the communicator compared to when they
read the same statements [26]. A second, even more
relevant line of research examines how communication
cues affect not just judgments of people’s mental states
but also judgments of their mental capacities. For
instance, observers who listen to a spoken statement
from a job candidate about he or she should be hired for
a job believe the candidate seems more intelligent and
hence employable than observers who read the same
statements [27]. Further, observers who listen to their
political opponents are less likely to dehumanize
opponents than those who read the same statements [7].
The aforementioned findings suggest it is easier to
infer mental states and mental capacities in a person
when hearing his or her spoken language compared to
reading the same language in text or seeing it
(nonverbally). Extending from this “person perception”
research, we turn to machine perception. We propose
that machines equipped with human speech will seem
particularly mentally capable and therefore more
human. This suggests, for example, that avatars that
have human bodies but not human voices may be less
convincingly humanlike, and therefore less trusted, than
those that lack body but have a voice. Two empirical
results support our prediction.
First, Waytz, Heafner, and Epley (2014) conducted
an experiment to anthropomorphize a self-driving car.
Passengers in a self-driving car simulator whose car had
a name, gender, and human voice in the GPS (the
anthropomorphized condition) reported that their car
seemed more humanlike and rational and they trusted
their car more compared to passengers in the same
simulator whose car was given no name or gender and
had a computer voice for GPS (the control condition).
This experiment did not provide a clean test of visual
cues compared to voice cues for anthropomorphism, but
it did suggest that adding voice can be humanizing and
it also demonstrated that anthropomorphism can lead to
trust.
Second, Schroeder and Epley (2016) conducted a
series of experiments using a “Turing Test” paradigm in
which participants guessed whether the content of a
script had been created by a computer or a human.
Participants either read a script or saw it being recited
by an actor through different media which provided
audiovisual, only visual, or only audio information
across experiments. Participants were consistently most
likely to believe the script was created by a human when
they heard a human voice reciting it, compared to
whether they read it or watched it. This was true whether
the script had actually been created by a human or a
computer.

But voice may not always be humanizing. In one
experiment, Schroeder and Epley (2016) compared the
effect of different types of voices on humanization.
They asked actors to read written statements aloud in a
“mindful” way—taking the perspective of the writer and
imbuing their words with thought and feeling—or in a
“mindless” way—reading the words as if they had no
meaning. Evaluators were more likely to infer the script
was created by a human when they heard the mindful
(vs. mindless) voices, an effect mediated by variance in
intonation. This suggests that perhaps only mindful,
humanlike voices—those that have naturalistic variance
in intonation, for instance—will make evaluators
believe an agent has greater mental capacity.
There is also reason to believe that the causal
relationship between anthropomorphism and trust is
more complicated than these few experiments would
suggest. Machines that are perceived to have greater
capacity to think, while seeming more humanlike, may
also seem more capable of deception, a trait considered
toxic to trust [28]. People are particularly wary of
seemingly intelligent robots who might steal their jobs,
a phenomenon referred to in the media as “botsourcing”
[6]. Therefore, capacity to think may increase trust
curvilinearly—machines that seem somewhat more
intelligent may be trusted but machines that seem
extremely intelligent (e.g., devious) may not be trusted.
Regarding capacity to feel, recent research suggests that
when people perceive machines to have greater capacity
to feel, it gives them moral standing [29], which may in
turn afford greater trust. In one experiment, consumers
that were induced to believe their cars were more
interpersonally warm used more humanlike traits to
describe their cars and were less likely to get rid of them
[30], suggesting warmth may increase trust. Based on
this small body of literature, we predict that people will
be more likely to trust machines with humanlike voices
that seem more capable of thinking and feeling, but that
particularly intelligent machines may seem threatening
to humans, making them less likely to share personal
information.

1.4. Current Study
We tested our two predictions, that talking to a
machine and being talked to by a machine will affect
trusting behavior toward the machine, in a field
experiment. We collected over 300 participants in a
geographical location in which participants would be
relatively familiar with interacting with machines (near
Silicon Valley, California). We collected community
members on a busy street intersection outside a
University campus to increase our diversity in
participants’ demographic characteristics. We selected a
“chatbot” machine with which users could converse
called Cleverbot.
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In addition to manipulating whether users talked or
typed, and whether the machine talked or typed in
return, our experiment also manipulated Cleverbot’s
gender (male or female). If people apply human gender
stereotypes to machines, as some research suggests [31],
the machine’s perceived gender could influence users’
trust as well. Therefore our field experiment had eight
conditions in a 2 (user’s expression modality: talk, type)
× 2 (machine’s response modality: talk, type) × 2
(machine’s gender: male, female) between-participants
fully randomized experimental design. Users interacted
with the machine in one of these eight conditions, then
evaluated the machine on a survey and reported their
willingness to provide personal information to it.

2. Method
2.1. Participants
We recruited 304 adults (Mage = 22.91, SDage = 7.67,
8 participants failed to report age; 44.4% male, 51.6%
female, 3.9% opted not to report gender) on a busy street
corner outside of a west-coast University campus to be
in the experiment. Participants received a food item of
their choice for their time.

2.2. Machine Selection
Running this experiment required a machine that
could talk to users or type to users, and would allow
users to talk or type in return. It further required a
machine with a relatively humanlike voice that we could
manipulate as either female or male. We examined
virtual assistant and entertainment applications to
identify a machine that had exactly this functionality.
Our search revealed a machine that fit our needs: a
chatterbot application called “Cleverbot.” Developed by
artificial intelligence scientist Rollo Carpenter, this
application uses an algorithm to have conversations
with humans. Its responses are not pre-programmed but
rather learnt from human input. Cleverbot has held over
200 million conversations since it went online in 1997,
and it is growing in data size at a rate of 4 to 7 million
interactions per second.
Because our intent in this experiment was to
manipulate anthropomorphism, we wanted a machine
that would seem relatively humanlike. Cleverbot also
fits this criteria: In the 2011 Turing test competition,
Cleverbot was judged to be 59.3% human, compared to
the rating of 63.3% human achieved by human
participants. We further preferred a machine with a
humanlike voice. We were unable to find pre-existing
data on the quality of Cleverbot’s voice, so we collected
some data during our own study.

We used the iPhone application version of
Cleverbot for our experiment. Users interacted with the
phone by speaking into its microphone or typing on the
phone keyboard. Cleverbot then responded either via
text or in the standard male or female U.S. English voice
pre-loaded onto the phone.

2.3. Procedure
Once a participant agreed to take part on our study,
we randomly assigned him or her to one of eight
possible experimental conditions. We did not run
participants who indicated that they were already
familiar with Cleverbot. We collected verbal consent
from the participant and explained that the participant
would interact with Cleverbot and then evaluate him or
her on a survey. We then showed participants the phone
application, which was pre-loaded on the
experimenter’s phone with the correct settings based on
the experimental condition. We gave participants a short
introduction about Cleverbot (“He [she] is primarily
used for entertainment. He [she] has a great personality
and can interact with you.”) and then demonstrated how
to use Cleverbot by asking, “Hi, how are you?” either
verbally or via text. The Cleverbot interface is depicted
in Figure 1.
Figure 1.

Participants received a list of questions to ask
Cleverbot for the interaction. We developed these
questions to yield consistently sensible responses from
Cleverbot (1. What do you do for fun? 2. Tell me a joke.
3. What’s the meaning of life? 4. Are you my friend?)
We encouraged participants not to deviate from these
questions to ensure consistency between experimental
conditions. However, we also recorded participants’
conversations to determine whether there were any
differences in context exchanged based on experimental
condition.
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Once participants completed testing the
application, we explained: “We are trying to develop
Cleverbot into a virtual personal assistant. We want to
know if it would be a useful product for people.”
Finally, participants completed a survey evaluating their
experience and impressions of Cleverbot.

2.4. Survey
The survey consisted of three parts: “Evaluations of
Cleverbot,” “Giving Cleverbot access to your phone,”
and “General Questions.” In Part 1, users completed five
questions measuring anthropomorphism drawn from the
Human Uniqueness scale (Bastian & Haslam, 2010): 1.
How intelligent did he [she] seem? 2. How responsive
did he [she] seem? 3. How sophisticated did he [she]
seem? 4. How superficial (lacking depth) did he [she]
seem? 5. To what extend did he [she] seem to have a
mind of his [her] own? They responded to each question
on 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) Likert scales. These five
items
formed
our
primary
measure
of
anthropomorphism (α = .76). We also asked how fast
Cleverbot seemed, on the same response scale, to
control for response speed differences across
conditions.
In Part 2, the survey asked participants to check
which of their phone applications and personal
information they would be willing to give Cleverbot
(see Figure 2). We provided seven phone applications
(calendar, contacts, location, Facebook, email, camera,
photos/videos) and five pieces of personal information
(full name, home address, credit card number, Amazon
purchase history, Internet search history), thereby
allowing the participant to check up to 12 items. For
each option, we also provided the reason why Cleverbot
would need to access it. The total number of items that
participants were willing to give access to formed our
primary measure of behavioral trust. The survey also
asked participants directly, “Overall, how much would
trust Cleverbot with your personal, private
information?” (1=Not at all; 7=A great deal).
Figure 2.

Finally, in Part 3 of the survey, we asked
participants “Overall, how comfortable are you when
approaching new technology?” (1=Not at all
comfortable; 7=Extremely comfortable) and “Overall
how familiar are you with using virtual assistants (such
as SIRI)?” (1=Not at all familiar; 7=Extremely
familiar). We collected participants’ demographic
information (e.g., age, gender). Among participants who
listened to Cleverbot, we asked, “How much did you
like Cleverbot’s voice?” (1=Not at all; 7=A great deal)
as an approximation of the quality of the voice.

2.5. Conversation Coding
There was wide variety in the topics of participants’
conversations with Cleverbot, which ranged from
asking over 10 questions to asking only the 4 questions
that we required. Due to technical issues, we only
recorded 179 of the 304 conversations (59%). Three
research assistants divided up each set of user’s
questions and Cleverbot’s answers within each
conversation, resulting in 923 conversation threads.
They rated them on three criteria: whether or not
Cleverbot’s response was sensible, whether or not
Cleverbot’s response was relevant to the question that
was asked, and whether not Cleverbot’s response was
entertaining. These three ratings had adequate reliability
across the raters (αs = .72, .83, and .69) [32].

3. Results
We first tested the effect of our experimental
conditions on behavioral trust (the sum of things to
which participants allowed Cleverbot access, out of 12)
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by running a 2 (user’s expression modality: talk, type) ×
2 (machine’s response modality: talk, type) × 2
(machine’s gender: male, female) between-participants
ANOVA analysis. We found the predicted main effect
of expression modality, F(1, 294) = 6.97, p = .009, such
that users who talked to Cleverbot gave it more access
(M = 6.45, SD = 3.07) than users who texted (M = 5.53,
SD = 2.89). However, there was no effect of response
modality, F(1, 294) = 0.01, p = .907, or the machine’s
gender, F(1, 294) = 1.42, p = .234, or any interactions
between conditions, Fs < 1.
We next ran the same analysis in a linear regression
model, but also controlling for participants’ selfreported comfort with new technology, their age, their
familiarity interacting with virtual assistants, and their
gender (1=female; 0=male). This analysis revealed the
same results; expression modality predicted behavioral
trust (β = .157, p = .008) but response modality and
gender did not (ps = .937 & .340, respectively). Comfort
with new technology (β = .214, p = .003), participants’
age (β = -.133, p = .025), and participants’ gender (β = .116, p = .055) each also predicted behavioral trust such
that participants who were more comfortable with
technology, younger, and male were more likely to trust
the machine. Although the effects of comfort with
technology and age were not surprising, we did not
anticipate an effect of participants’ gender. However,
we note that this effect was only marginally statistically
significant and should be tested in future research to see
if it will replicate. We further tested whether the match
in participants’ gender and the machine’s gender
increased trust; it did not, p > .250. Familiarity with
virtual assistants also did not predict trust, p > .250).
Finally, controlling for the perceived speed of the
interaction did not meaningfully change any of these
results nor did it independently predict trust, p > .250.
Our predicted mechanism via which response
modality could influence trust in machines was
anthropomorphism. Consistent with our lack of an effect
on behavioral trust, there was also no effect of response
modality condition on our anthropomorphism measure,
F(1, 295) = 0.02, p = .901. There were also no
significant effects of other experimental conditions, or
interactions, on anthropomorphism, Fs < 3.44, ps <
.065. Surprisingly, when we tested for effects of
condition on explicit self-reported trust of Cleverbot,
there were no effects, Fs < 1.50, ps > .221. This suggests
that expression modality may influence behavioral trust
but not self-reported trust of Cleverbot. However, as we
would expect, there was a strong positive relationship
between self-reported and behavioral trust, r = .622, p <
.001, and a smaller but also positive relationship
between anthropomorphism and behavioral trust, r =
.186, p < .001.
In a regression analysis predicting behavioral trust
including all of the controls listed previously (comfort

with new technology, user age and gender, and
familiarity with virtual assistants), as well as
anthropomorphism and self-reported trust, the effect of
expression modality remained significant (β = .134, p =
.006). Interestingly, in this model the effect of
anthropomorphism was negative (β = -.094, p = .094),
whereas self-reported trust remained a positive predictor
(β = .652, p < .001). The effects of comfort with new
technology and user age became non-significant,
suggesting that these effects on behavioral trust are
operating at least in part via self-reported trust. Further
controlling for the coded conversation characteristics in
the same analysis revealed no difference in results, and
none of the conversation characteristics predicted
behavioral trust.

4. General Discussion
Modern technology continues to integrate
characteristics and capabilities associated with artificial
intelligence. How users interact with this technology
can influence their likelihood for trusting machines with
their personal and sensitive information. Understanding
these interactions is integral to guiding secure
development as well as use. However, no prior research
has systematically examined the effect of the modality
of interaction on trust in machines. In a field experiment
with over 300 participants, we disentangle the effect of
two forms of interaction modality on trust for the first
time. Our results revealed that expression modality,
specifically whether the user is talking to a machine or
texting with a machine, can meaningfully influence
trust, but response modality, whether the machines talks
or types in return, may be less influential. Users who
talked to a “virtual assistant” phone application were
willing to share more of their personal information with
the application than users who typed. This finding was
robust to participants’ age, gender, comfort with new
technology, and familiarity with virtual assistants. But
whether the application talked or typed back to the
participant did not affect willingness to share.
Furthermore, the purported gender of the application did
not meaningfully affect trust.

4.1. Theoretical Implications
Our results shed important light on three key
theoretical questions in psychology and humancomputer interaction. First, expression modality has
been previously linked to self-control decisions [1-3]
but never to the related domain of trust. We identify a
potential tie between these previously unconnected lines
of research. Indeed, decades of research on human
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evolution suggests that our society is based on norms of
trust and cooperation, which are required for peaceful
coexistence [33, 34]. Therefore, it may require selfcontrol, or at least the regulation of one’s intuitive
response, to withhold trust. Whereas prior research
demonstrates that verbally expressing one’s preferences
leads the respondent to make more hedonistic choices,
our research demonstrates that verbal communication
with a machine may lead to a heuristic of trust.
Second,
the
relationship
between
anthropomorphism and trust is not well-understood.
Very little empirical research has examined this
question. A recent meta-analysis on factors influencing
trust in human-robot interactions identified only 29
relevant empirical quantitative articles published
between 1996 and 2010, of which only one article
examined the effect of anthropomorphism on trust [35].
In our own search, we identified just one more
experiment on anthropomorphism and trust. Both of
these experiments show simply that machines that seem
more human-like are also trusted more [5, 36]. But there
are many reasons to believe that anthropomorphism
may not linearly increase with trust—for instance, smart
machines may be threatening [6]. We think it is unlikely
in our study that participants felt threatened by the
machine with whom they interacted. Indeed, in our raw
data, there was a positive correlation between
anthropomorphism and trust. However, once we
controlled for other predictors of trust (e.g., comfort
level), the association between anthropomorphism and
trust became negative, suggesting there is much more to
understand about this relationship.
Third, how do we incite anthropomorphism of
machines? Prior research has focused on perceiver
characteristics
that
trigger
anthropomorphism,
suggesting there are two primary predictors of
anthropomorphism, the perceiver’s motive for
understanding and for connection [37]. But a much more
direct method is to add human features to machines. For
example, merely giving a robot a name, physical body,
eyes, nationality, or gender makes it seem more
humanlike and makes people interact it with more like
they would with a human, compared with robots lacking
these features [40, 41]. A simple read of this literature
might suggest that adding any human cue to a machine
will induce anthropomorphism. Yet our results indicate
that this conclusion would be unwise. Perhaps the cues
added to machines need to achieve a threshold
“humanness” before they affect anthropomorphism.
Adding a voice to a machine may not be sufficient for
anthropomorphism if the voice does not sound

adequately human, even though in theory any voice
should be more humanizing than no voice.

4.2 Limitations
Our study is limited in at least two ways. First, we
operationalized trust as giving personal information to a
machine, but this behavior may not perfectly express
trust. For instance, it could also be related to
convenience; disclosing more information can also
seem more convenient in this context. Although selfreported trust of the machine did strongly positively
correlate with willingness to disclose information, our
experimental condition did not affect self-reported trust.
This indicates that there might be some discrepancy
between this particular measure of trust and how lay
people think about trust. Furthermore, we only used a
single measure of trust instead of a full scale. Future
research should test how interaction mode affects
behavioral and self-reported trust using many different
operationalizations, to better understand the construct of
trust in this domain and what drives it.
Second, a gold standard for all research is
independent direct and conceptual replication. We
presented one study with intriguing evidence but it is
critical that this research is replicated in other domains.
This is particularly necessary for understanding
generalizability. For example, would this pattern of data
replicate with a different sample (e.g., older population,
rural America, other countries)? Would it replicate with
a different machine than Cleverbot?

4.3. Future Directions
Beyond the future directions implied by our
limitations discussed in the prior section, our results also
highlight other directions for future work. First, why
exactly does expression modality affect trustworthy
behavior? It is important to understand the
psychological pathway between talking to machines and
trusting them. The explanation that is best supported by
prior research is that talking is associated with a hedonic
or heuristic-driven mindset. If people are naturally
trusting, this could result in greater trust in machines
when talking to them. However, there are several other
possible explanations. For one, talking may create a
deeper feeling of engagement and sociability than
typing, which could increase trust. A second possibility
is the talking incites feelings of agency and control,
which make individuals less suspicious about sharing
their information. Future research could test these
different possible explanations.
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Second, there is a substantial need to better
understand how adding human cues to machines affects
anthropomorphism and trust. A comprehensive theory
comparing the relative predictive power of each human
cue on trust is lacking. It is unclear, for instance,
whether human face or voice would be a better predictor
of anthropomorphism. Which communication cues are
most associated with innate humanness?
Third, it is possible to investigate the level of trust
a human has in a machine in further detail. For example,
more granular levels of trust, based on level of human
direction and machine autonomy, can be defined and
tested. These factors align to current and emerging
technology used in machines and can provide insight
into the risk and acceptance of such technology.
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